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Abstract 
The effectiveness of the European Union (EU) as global regulator is controversial. 
Some scholars characterize the EU as one of the most important shapers of global 
regulations; others argue that the EU’s effectiveness critically depends on its 
regulatory cohesion, the political opportunity structure and regulatory capacity of its 
interlocutors. Since global sport represents a regionally segmented industry and is 
governed by private actors of diverse regulatory capacity, global sport regulation 
represents an excellent domain to study these propositions systematically. 
Comparative case studies on global sport regulation support the idea that the EU can 
impose its regulatory ambitions on sport governing due to market size and regulatory 
capacity. However, the broader political opportunity structure is found to be relevant 
and the EU does not appear as a strong regulator of global sports. 
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Introduction 
The single market represents the most salient presence of the European Union (EU) 
in the international system (Dür and Zimmermann, 2007). The EU has been 
characterized as great ‘market power’ (Damro, 2012) effectively shaping global 
regulation (Bach and Newman, 2010). The EU’s success has been attributed to the 
size of its internal market and comparative advantage in regulatory capability. 
However, Young (2011) has recently challenged the EU’s image as influential global 
regulator by claiming that the EU’s success hinges on the regulatory capability of its 
interlocutors and congruence with their preferences.  
The research presented here contributes to this debate by focusing on the 
EU’s success as global regulator of sports. Sport represents a critical case for 
examining the EU’s effectiveness because the EU’s market size varies considerably. 
Moreover, global sport regulation by public authorities is hardly institutionalized. 
Furthermore, sport is a hybrid sector, where low regulatory cohesion is likely. 
Nevertheless, the EU has acquired a reputation for being one of the few public 
authorities to influence sport regulation (Meier and García, 2015; Geeraert and 
Drieskens, 2015). It has been argued that the EU did not want to get involved in 
regulating sport but ended up doing it through the application of single market 
policies to sport and reacting to judgments of the Court of Justice (García 2007). 
However, through the involvement of different EU institutions and external actors 
evolving through legal decisions, political declarations and other non-binding reports 
and communications (Parrish, 2003; Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015), a distinctive 
regulatory approach to sport although not necessarily a deliberate policy by the EU 
seems to have evolved.   
Building on previous accounts (Young, 2011; Dür and Zimmermann, 2007; 
Bach and Newman, 2010), the following set of questions is explored: 
1. Which objectives can be identified in the EU regulatory approach to 
global sport?  
2. Is the EU able to attain regulatory cohesion? 
3. How effective is the EU in accomplishing its objectives? 
After a review of the literature and a presentation of the research design, the results 
of four cases where EU institutions were involved in global sport regulation are 
presented.   
The EU’s success as global regulator 
Scholars have presented a number of complementary rather than competing 
propositions for explaining the EU’s success as global regulator:  
1. Market size. Since the EU represents the world’s biggest internal market and is the 
largest exporter and importer of goods and services (Young, 2011; Young and 
Peterson, 2013), it enjoys ‘structural power’ in world trade allowing the EU to 
globalize its regulatory standards (cf. Meunier and Nicolaïdes, 2006; Dür and 
Zimmermann, 2007).  
2. Regulatory capacity and cohesion. According to Bach and Newman (2007), the 
EU’s success as global regulator results from its superior regulatory capacity. Thus, 
the EU’s character as a ‘regulatory state’ creates a comparative advantage providing 
‘tools to set market rules internationally as well’ (Bach and Newman, 2007, p. 828). 
However, whereas Bach and Newman (2007) deem regulatory cohesion to be 
beneficial, it has been emphasized that low cohesion might strengthen the EU’s 
bargaining position in case the EU is on the defensive because the EU’s high 
threshold for internal agreements prevents EU negotiators from making concessions 
(Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2006; Young, 2011).  
3. Regulatory politics. According to the ‘regulatory politics’ approach, an interplay 
of domestic and global factors accounts for the rise of the EU as global regulator 
(Kelemen and Vogel 2010; Kelemen, 2010). Hence, the fundamental tension 
between rules designed to perfect the single market and the global competitiveness 
for producers outside that market (Smith, 2011) can only be reconciled by uploading 
EU standards (Jacoby and Meunier, 2010). 
4. Political opportunity structure. Young (2011) has stressed that previous research 
neglected that the EU’s success depends not only on the EU’s regulatory capability 
but also on (a) the regulatory capability of its interlocutor(s) and (b) how the EU’s 
regulatory preferences align with those of non-EU governments.  
Accordingly, our empirical account explores to what extent these explanations might 
be relevant for understanding the EU’s success as global sport regulator. 
Peculiarities of global sport regulation 
Building on a rather narrow traditional understanding of regulation as economic 
regulation (e.g. Young, 2007, p. 374), global sport regulation by the EU might be 
tentatively defined as the EU adoption of decisions and rules aimed at professional 
sports intended to correct market failures, which applies also beyond the EU’s 
borders. However, it is important to realize that sport policy pursues aims beyond the 
efficient provision of sport entertainment, such as, broad participation and inclusion 
in physical activity for reasons of public health and integration. Due to the clash of 
policy agendas (cf. below), even the EU’s involvement in global sport regulation 
cannot be reduced to economic goals. Indeed, one of the characteristics of the EU’s 
approach to sport is its ‘Janus-faced’ nature, where economic and socio-cultural 
elements have interacted.  
In addition, professional sport shows some peculiarities:  
1. Strong market segregation. Only the Olympics and football (soccer) may claim 
global popularity. Whereas North America and Europe represent the two biggest 
sport markets (PWC, 2011), even here market power is segregated. Between 2010 
and 2012 European markets accounted for 22% of the broadcasting income of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) whereas North America accounted for 
55.9% (IOC, 2013, p. 27). In contrast, 49.6% of the Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association (FIFA)’s broadcasting income in 2012 and 2013 came from 
Europe but only 10.5% from North America (FIFA, 2013, p. 100). Yet, global 
revenues for soccer are higher than combined revenues for all U.S. sports, Formula 1 
racing, tennis and golf (A.T. Kearney, 2011).  
2. Diffuse character and low capability. International sport governance has been 
diffuse and shaped by organizational rivalries, for example between the IOC and the 
International Federations (IFs), which govern the distinct sports. Moreover, the IFs 
share governance responsibilities with a broad range of stakeholders (leagues, clubs, 
athletes, organizers, etc.). Additionally, sport has been perceived as an autonomous 
sphere where political interference should be avoided (Chappelet 2010). The EU’s 
ambitions to impose regulatory standards are likely to be perceived as particular 
interventionist or ‘deep trade agenda’ challenging incumbent regulatory authorities 
(Young and Peterson, 2006; Damro, 2006) because global professional sport relies 
on a complex and interwoven set of regulations. Thus, the EU might have to deal 
with interlocutors of only restricted regulatory capability and hostile to any public 
intervention (García and Weatherill, 2012). 
3. Clash of policy agendas and low cohesion. While professional sport represents an 
entertainment industry, Europeans perceive it as a much larger and deeper grassroots 
movement relying on volunteering and creating social capital. Hence, sport’s hybrid 
character has given rise to a political agenda critical of market-oriented sport 
regulation (Parrish, 2003; Croci, 2009).  
Thus, the EU’s market size in sport varies considerably, regulatory efforts are likely 
to be perceived as invasive, and diffuse governance structures restrict the regulatory 
capacity of those same stakeholders. Finally, sport’s hybrid character makes low 
policy cohesion likely. 
Case selection and method 
Preferably, the cases examined should have been selected in order to test the 
competing explanatory approaches, that is, market size, regulatory capacity, 
regulatory politics and political opportunity structure. Unfortunately, the population 
of cases is rather limited. Thus, it proved difficult to systematically control for 
market size even though both soccer and non-soccer related cases are included. 
Therefore, case selection follows the main rationale to focus on different regulatory 
ambitions. Accordingly, cases are examined where the EU aimed to (a) impose its 
governance standards on sport governing bodies, (b) protect athletes (c) and protect 
consumers. The organization of the case studies follows Young and Peterson (2013) 
and focuses on key variables, that is, i) political opportunity structure, ii) regulatory 
capacity and cohesion, iii) regulatory politics/processes and iv) outcomes. Yet, while 
careful process tracing has been employed, space restrictions allow only presenting 
highly stylized facts. 
Political opportunity structure is defined as the degree to which EU’s 
regulatory preferences align with those of (a) other governments and (b) the sport 
governing bodies. Regulatory capacity and cohesion is understood as 
multidimensional construct comprising of (a) regulatory expertise, (b) coherence, and 
(c) the extent of statutory sanctioning authority (Bach and Newman, 2007). 
However, it seems useful to distinguish between a horizontal and vertical dimension 
(Smith, 2004). Concerning the horizontal dimension, regulatory capacity and 
cohesion refers first to the legal base of the EU’s regulatory activities, second to the 
existence of competing agendas at the EU level. The vertical dimension regards the 
conformity of Member States’ policies with the EU’s regulatory ambitions. Tracing 
regulatory politics/processes serves to assess the EU’s impact on the regulations at 
stake. The outcomes of the regulatory processes will be assessed in terms of 
‘preference attainment’.  
Imposing governance standards:  
The creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) 
Doping has been perceived as a violation of fairness and a health threat, which could 
detrimentally affect the broader society due to the athletes’ status as role models 
(Dimeo, 2007). Although the sport governing bodies have condemned doping, they 
failed to effectively address the problem, which ultimately led to the creation of 
WADA. 
Political opportunity structure 
Alignment with non-EU government’s preferences: The cold war inspired highly 
sophisticated doping systems and made credible governmental cooperation in anti-
doping impossible (Hunt, 2007, p.19). The collapse of communism removed these 
barriers for cooperation and increased pressure on sport authorities to intensify anti-
doping efforts (Houlihan, 2002; Hunt, 2011). Finally, the so-called Festina scandal 
during the 1998 Tour de France catalyzed an unprecedented international 
governmental consensus on the inefficiency of the existing control system (Hanstad, 
Smith and Waddington, 2008).  
 
Alignment with sport bodies’ preferences: Doping policies represent a classic 
example of sport’s self-regulation (Houlihan, 2002). However, diffuse international 
sport governance prevented regulatory harmonization and effective tests. The IOC 
failed as regulatory authority because some IFs were not strongly dedicated to anti-
doping (Hunt, 2011). National sport federations at least tolerated doping practices 
(Houlihan, 2002). Finally, the IOC made financial vitality a top concern in the 1980s 
and decreased its commitment to anti-doping (Hanstadt et al., 2008; Hunt, 2011). 
Although governments increased demands for stricter anti-doping policies in the 
1990s, sport bodies resisted as much as they could any external regulatory agenda. 
Regulatory capacity and cohesion 
Legal mandate: Lacking a sport competence, the EU was hardly a visible actor in 
anti-doping policies before the Festina scandal (Vermeersch, 2006). Only after being 
asked by the Council (OJ, 1992, C 44/1), the Commission drafted an unambitious 
Code of Conduct heavily relying on Council of Europe initiatives (SEC (91) 2030 
Final).  
Competing agendas at EU level: Notwithstanding broad support for stricter global 
anti-doping policies among the Member States, a stronger EU involvement competed 
with the Member States’ concerns about supranational competence creeping.  
Vertical conformity with Member States’ policies: Although the Member States 
followed different regulatory trajectories, they cooperated in the Council of Europe 
(CoE), which had assumed leadership in anti-doping policies since the 1970s. The 
1984 CoE Anti-Doping Charter recommended public authorities to support the 
harmonization, implementation and enforcement of anti-doping regulations (CoE, 
1984). The Charter was endorsed by the IOC, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the World Health Association 
(WHO) (Houlihan, 2002, p.160) and resulted in the first World Conference on 
Doping in Sport held in Ottawa in late June 1988, which proposed stronger 
cooperation between sports authorities and national governments (Hunt, 2011, p.83). 
This demand was taken on in the CoE’s Anti-Doping Convention of 1989 (CoE, 
1989). After the Festina scandal, the EU sports ministers, the European Council, the 
European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions called on the Commission to 
make proposals for a more harmonized public health policy addressing doping 
(Vermeersch, 2006).  
Regulatory politics/processes 
The decisive steps towards far-reaching policy innovations were taken at the ‘World 
Conference on Doping in Sports’ hosted by the IOC in Lausanne in February 1999. 
Whereas the IOC intended to regain control of the doping issue, representatives from 
the UK, the U.S.A. and Germany took the opportunity to blame IOC leadership for 
an inconsequent and hypocritical approach towards doping (Hanstad et al., 2009). 
The criticism converged around a demand for jurisdictional segregation and the 
creation of a new independent body: WADA (DeFrantz, 2008).  
The Commission’s plan against doping (COM (1999) 643 Final) presented 
after the Lausanne conference included a commitment to the WADA process. The 
Commission claimed to have been decisive for securing organizational independence 
and transparency of WADA, parity between public and sport authorities and the 
submission of all involved parties to norms, criteria and procedures of WADA 
(European Commission, 1999). Moreover, the Commission acted (together with a 
representative from the EU Presidency) for two years as EU representative in the 
WADA Foundation Board (OJ, 2000, C 356).  
Outcome 
The creation of WADA enabled European governments to attain long-held policy 
preferences. The Second World Conference on Doping in Sport in 2003 drafted the 
World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) achieving an unprecedented level of global 
regulatory harmonization. Moreover, as it was agreed to create an International Anti-
Doping Convention under the auspices of UNESCO, the WADA regime has a solid 
base in international law and a much more aggressive mandate to mitigate doping 
(Hunt, 2011, p.87). The WADA process catalyzes also institutional isomorphism 
since governments are required to emulate the WADA structure and to create 
national anti-doping organizations (NADOs).  
However, in relation to its share in WADA funding (47.5%), the EU seems 
underrepresented in WADA’s Foundation Board (3 members out of 15). 
Furthermore, the WADA process failed to serve as catalyst of a more structured anti-
doping policy within the EU. Finally, the Commission withdrew from WADA in 
2001 because the lacking EU competence in sport made it impossible to reconcile the 
WADA budgetary rules with Community financial rules (European Commission, 
2001). After 2009, now with a formal competence on sport, the EU is developing a 
minimum common approach to anti-doping and WADA. However, there is clearly 
no appetite for direct regulation and most actions focus on amateur sport (De Wolff, 
2016). 
Protecting athletes’ rights:  
Liberalizing the player market 
As the soccer bodies traditionally opposed professionalization and perceived 
deregulated player markets as economic threat, they placed players at the bottom of a 
decision-making pyramid headed at the top by the game’s global governing body, 
FIFA (Tomlinson, 1983). Regulations adopted by FIFA (at global level) or the Union 
of European Football Associations (UEFA) (at European level) are applied in 
cascade at national level. FIFA and UEFA’s regulation of players’ employment 
relied in two sets of norms: transfer systems and nationality quotas (Lanfranchi and 
Taylor 2001, p.218).  
EU institutions started to notice tension between player market regulations 
and the freedom of movement for workers since the 1980s. However, they took a 
rather conciliatory stand (García and Meier, 2012). It was not until the 1995 
judgment of the Bosman case that a real regulatory effort by the Commission took 
place. This case study focuses on the actions between December 1995 and 2001, 
when the Commission reached an agreement with UEFA and FIFA on the reform of 
their international transfer system. 
In Bosman the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that both 
the international transfer system, in particular the requirement to pay transfer fees 
even after the end of the payer’s contract, and nationality quotas were in breach of 
freedom of movement provisions (CJEU 1995). Not long after the Bosman ruling, 
the Commission addressed a warning letter to UEFA and FIFA giving them six 
weeks to inform of the measures they were taking to comply with Community law 
(European Commission, 1996b, p. 1). 
Political opportunity structure 
Alignment with non-EU government’s preferences: Although a number of 
countries exported players to other EU countries, they did not take a visible stance on 
the player market conflict.  
Alignment with sport bodies’ preferences: FIFA and UEFA continued to be hostile 
to any player market liberalization. After Bosman, they informed the Commission 
that the international transfer system would no longer apply to player movements 
within the European Economic Area (EEA) but that the rules were not officially 
revoked (European Commission, 1996a). Moreover, the clubs responded by 
extending contract durations and increasing fees for player transfers during the 
contract period. The governing bodies opposed the full liberalization of the players 
market as demanded by the Commission (Bose, 2000). Governing bodies, with the 
support of European professional leagues, wanted to preserve stability of contracts as 
much as possible and to re-label transfer fees as ‘training compensation fees’ so 
clubs could still receive payment for player transfers (Bose 2000; European 
Commission 2000; Meier and García 2013; García and Meier 2012).  
 
Regulatory capacity and cohesion 
Legal mandate: The legal mandate for this regulatory effort was strong, as the 
European Commission, and especially the Directorate General for Competition (DG 
COMP), was relying on a firm ruling of the CJEU (1995). The Commission, thus, 
was acting on safe grounds, as it is responsible to ensure compliance with EU 
primary and secondary legislation. Moreover, the Commission launched this 
investigation under competition policy regulations, a domain where it enjoys a wide 
power and autonomy. 
Competing agendas at EU level: The Commission faced political opposition, even 
internally. According to Parrish (2003, p. 251), this opposition resulted from the 
emergence of two competing ‘advocacy coalitions’ after Bosman. A ‘single market 
coalition’, formed by DG COMP, the Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizen Rights and the Court of Justice demanded considering sport a business like 
any other. In contrast, a ‘socio-cultural coalition’ demanded a special treatment of 
sport even at professional level. This socio-cultural coalition featured the Directorate 
General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) in the Commission, high-level 
members of the Party of the European Socialists in the Parliament, sport governing 
bodies and, importantly, ‘most of the Member States governments’ (Parrish, 2003, p. 
251). Yet, Croci (2009) has argued that the EU has always pursued two contradictory 
objectives in the field of sport: the correction of market failures of professional sport 
and the maintenance of sport as a social, cultural, health and educational activity. 
The clash of these two agendas is reflected in the Amsterdam Declaration on Sport, 
which called ‘on the bodies of the European Union to listen to sports associations 
when important questions affecting sport are at issue’ (European Council, 1997).  
Vertical conformity with Member States’ policies: Although Member States 
opposed player market liberalization at EU level, most of the large countries in 
Europe had already liberalized their national transfer systems well before 1995. The 
tendency towards liberalization of national soccer markets might explain why the 
Member States were never completely behind the position of FIFA (Meier and 
García, 2013). Nevertheless, most Member States declared to be concerned about an 
excessive liberalization of the players market. The differences between Commission 
and Member States became evident once formal proceedings were launched. On 9 
September 2000 Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder published a joint statement that 
diplomatically supported UEFA and FIFA:  
The British and German Governments are concerned at the potential impact 
of proposed changes to the football transfer system. (…) The European 
Union has criticised the present system of transfer fees (…) We 
acknowledge the current system is not perfect. We fear however that a 
radical reform could have a negative impact on the structures of football in 
Europe. (…) We believe that any solution has to balance carefully the 
justified interests of both the players, the clubs and the associations. (…) We 
offer our help in seeking to resolve the issue. (…) We look to the 
Commission to be sympathetic to the special needs of professional football 
in seeking a solution (Prime Minister's Office, 2000b, p. 1). 
The British Prime Minister worked also with governments of Spain, the Netherlands 
and Italy to demonstrate disagreement with the Commission’s liberalization plans 
(Prime Minister's Office, 2000a).  
Regulatory politics/processes 
Unhappy with the soccer bodies’ response to Bosman, the Commission informed 
FIFA and UEFA on 27 June 1996 that two particular issues, on which the Court had 
not ruled in Bosman, posed extra problems in the light of article 101 TFEU 
(European Commission, 1996a, p. 5-6). After FIFA and UEFA refused to take those 
aspects into account, the Commission started infringement procedures on 14 
December 1998 (European Commission, 2002, p. 1). The Commission addressed the 
payment of fees for international transfers within the EEA of players from third 
countries at the end of their contracts, and the obligation imposed by FIFA on 
national FAs to set up national transfer systems mirroring the one outlawed in 
Bosman (Parrish, 2003, p. 140-142). When FIFA remained inactive, the Commission 
defined a firm deadline of 31 October 2000 for proposals to amend the international 
transfer system (Reding, 2000, p. 2; Parrish, 2003, p. 141). 
A Transfer Task Force with the participation of FIFA, UEFA, the 
international soccer players union (FIFPro), and European professional leagues was 
set up (UEFA, 2000). This Task Force agreed on a set of proposals on 27 October 
2000, which were then sent to the Commission (Bose 2000). The Commission (2000: 
1) was ready to accept rules limiting transfers to a certain period during the season 
and also recognised that ‘stability of contracts is very important in this sector’. 
Finally, the Commission (ibid.) was prepared to consider the concept of ‘training 
compensation fees’ for young players. In 2001 a number of high level meetings 
between the commissioners responsible for the negotiations and the presidents of 
FIFA and UEFA were held, during which the two sides agreed on transfer windows, 
minimum and maximum duration of contracts and the principle of compensation for 
training costs (European Commission, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c). After the governing 
bodies agreed to these reforms (European Commission, 2001d), the Commission 
closed the investigation in June 2002 (European Commission, 2002b). 
Outcome 
The demands of the Commission diluted considerably over time, which might be 
explained by the clash of competing agendas (Parrish, 2003) or the fact that the 
Commission employed negotiation as ‘mode of governance’ (Croci, 2009). Actually, 
these two explanations might be rather complementary since there were indeed two 
different views of sport regulation within EU institutions and sport stakeholders, and 
the Commission navigated through them in its very common compromise and 
negotiation mode of governance. Nevertheless, FIFA was forced to undertake a 
significant reform of its transfer system, most importantly to limit maximum contract 
duration to five years and to abolish end-of-contract transfer fees. However, training 
compensation fees were allowed for transfers of players under 23 years, transfer 
periods were limited, minimum contract duration was defined as one year and 
solidarity mechanisms redistributing income to clubs involved in the training and 
education of soccer players were implemented. This settlement falls short of the 
liberalisation initially demanded by the Commission (Meier and García, 2013) and is 
beneficial for the governing bodies (Parrish, 2003, p. 147). However, as FIFA 
decided to apply these transfer rules globally (Drolet, 2006; FIFA, 2001), the EU 
accounts for a modest global player market liberalization.  
Protecting EU athletes’ privacy  
Current anti-doping policies are rooted in a policy paradigm trying to eradicate 
doping by relying on effective surveillance of athletes, which inevitably raises the 
question of athletes’ rights. Accordingly, the 2003 WADC introduced so-called 
‘whereabouts’ rules demanding athletes to report on their location. Moreover, 
athletes had to be available for one hour per day between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. to make 
‘surprise’ anti-doping tests possible. Three ‘missed tests’ were to be punished as a 
doping offense (WADA, 2003). In order to ensure transparency and global 
enforcement, an online system with athletes’ whereabouts data stored in servers of 
the Anti-Doping Administration and Management System (ADAMS) was 
implemented.  
However, the 2003 WADC left IFs and NADOs too much discretion (Halt, 2009; 
MacGregor et al., 2013) resulting in inconsistent implementation of this scheme 
(Hanstad et al., 2010; Houlihan, 2013). Therefore, WADA aimed at further 
harmonization for the 2009 revision of the WADC. WADA’s 2008 draft for a new 
WADC and the International Standard for Testing (IST) demanded athletes to 
indicate, for each day during the following quarter, one specific 60-minute time slot 
for testing at a specific location (WADA, 2008, Art. 11.0). However, athletes were 
not going to be charged with a missed test if they could not be reached outside the 
one-hour slot (WADA, 2008, Art. 11.4).  
WADA’s plans were met with hostility by professional athletes and some 
governing bodies. The European Elite Athletes Association (EEAA) opposed the 
invasive character of whereabouts and demanded a stronger participation of athletes 
in the creation of drug testing regimes (EEAA, 2008). Athletes, individually, also 
complained of the severity of WADA’s plans (cf. Valkenburg et al., 2014). Soccer’s 
governing bodies FIFA and UEFA, as well as FIFPro, protested against privacy 
violations (FIFA, 2009; Slater, 2009). Crucially, these WADA proposals were 
criticized by EU actors claiming a violation of athletes’ privacy rights and possible 
infringements of EU data-protection legislation (cf. Waddington, 2010; De Wolff, 
2016).  
Political opportunity structure 
Alignment with non-EU government’s preference: Data-protection concerns 
contradict the basic policy paradigm of anti-doping according to which doping can 
only be eradicated by increasing athletes’ surveillance. Thus, EU concerns on data-
protection were seen as slowing down the global anti-doping fight. Moreover, 
‘privacy’ does not represent a globally accepted legal concept (McGregor et al., 
2013, 17-8). Thus, the EU faced substantial barriers to globalize its particular 
ambitious privacy standards (Drezner, 2004; Newman, 2008). With the exception of 
EU representatives, both the WADA Executive Committee and Foundation Board 
initially ignored EU’s concerns and demands (De Wolff 2016). 
Alignment with sport bodies’ preferences: From the beginning, WADA left no 
doubts that it disapproved of the EU’s demands.  
Regulatory capacity and cohesion 
Legal mandate: Anti-doping rules fall within the purview of EU law (Meca-Medina 
v. Commission of European Communities, 5 C.M.L.R. 18). The whereabouts system 
was in tension with a number of legal stipulations protecting athletes’ rights within 
the EU, such as the European Convention of Human Rights, the Working Time 
Directive of 2003 (Council Directive 90/104, 1993 O.J. (L 307) 18 (EU)) and the 
European Data Protection Directive of 1995 (Council Directive 95/46, 1995, O.J. 
L281/13 (EC)) (Halt, 2009; McGregor et al., 2013).  
Competing agendas at EU level: As already indicated, the EU faced a basic policy 
dilemma as promoter of stricter anti-doping polices and privacy protection. Hence, 
the EU failed to achieve regulatory cohesion. The EU Commissioner for Education, 
Training, Culture and Youth, Ján Figel, requested a legal opinion concerning the 
whereabouts system from the EU Working Party on Data Protection (WPDP). The 
WPDP did not coordinate with the European anti-doping policy community and 
seemed to promote uncompromisingly its own agenda, severely criticizing the data 
protection standards proposed by WADA for its new whereabouts system (cf. 
WADA, 2009b, p.3, 2009d, p.1). 
Vertical conformity with Member States’ policies: Since privacy and data 
protection regulations had been adopted by the Member States, privacy concerns 
were partially shared by the Member States, which also faced basic policy dilemmas. 
Regulatory politics/processes 
Whereas WADA signaled its unwillingness to compromise on the whereabouts 
system (Halt, 2009), it could not completely ignore EU’s resistance and drafted an 
‘International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information’ 
(ISPPPI) (WADA, 2009b). The ISPPPI acknowledged that the WADC raised privacy 
concerns but aimed only at implementing minimum data protection rules (WADA, 
2009b, Art. 1.0). Moreover, WADA claimed that its data policy was legitimized by 
the athletes’ informed consent (WADA, 2009b, Art. 6.0).   
In its response, the WPDP challenged central WADC stipulations. The 
WPDP established that the ISPPPI failed to meet EU data protection standards 
(WPDP, 2008, p.9) and demanded ‘a valid legal ground’, that is national legislation, 
for the whereabouts system (WPDP, 2008, 5). Moreover, the WPDP stated that a 
transfer of data from the EEA to a third country (i.e. Canada where the servers of 
ADAMS are located) could only take place if the third country ensured an adequate 
level of protection (WPDP, 2008, 6-7). Accordingly, the EU representative in 
WADA’s Executive Committee tried to get WADA to postpone the adoption of the 
revised whereabouts system until data-protection problems were duly addressed 
(Waddington, 2010).  
However, WADA revised the ISPPPI only in a very limited way (cf. WADA, 
2009a; Buchner, 2009). The WPDP now radicalized its critique and ‘disregard[ed] 
the WADC and International Standards insofar as they contradict domestic law’ 
(WPDP, 2009, p.3). The WPDP renewed its demand of a public-body status for the 
NADOs and opposition to data transfer into low protection jurisdictions (WPDP, 
2009).  
This second WPDP opinion provoked a particularly harsh response by 
WADA (Waddington, 2010, p.262). WADA blamed the WPDP for ‘undermine[ing] 
a critical pillar in the global strategy for combating anti-doping in sport’ (WADA, 
2009b, p.2) and ‘legislative imperialism’ (WADA, 2009d, p.15). WADA emphasized 
the WADC’s mandate in international law (WADA, 2009d, p.20) and issued a 
counter-threat by announcing that if personal data of EU athletes could not be 
processed, these athletes would not be able to participate in organized sport (WADA, 
2009d, p.17). Now, the EU gave in. EU and WADA only agreed to institutionalize 
the dialogue on privacy and data protection (European Commission, 2009). So far, 
the EU succeeded merely in convincing WADA to restrict publicity for data relating 
to minors (WPDP, 2013).  
Outcome 
The EU failed to globalize its paradigm for privacy and data protection in high-
performance sports (Buchner, 2009), mostly due to its demands for high data-
protection standards, a competing policy paradigm and active opposition of WADA. 
Moreover, the ISPPPI, although a concession to EU’s regulatory standards, is seen 
by specialists as a toothless minimum standard that includes no procedures for 
sanctioning any misconduct concerning confidential data on behalf of WADA 
(Trainor, 2010).  
Protecting sport consumers:  
Banning tobacco advertising  
In order to reduce smoking, the EU as well as other public authorities progressively 
restricted tobacco advertising. Inevitably, these efforts reached the sport domain as 
tobacco industry heavily sponsored sports because it could link its products to health, 
beauty and purity and circumvent advertising bans (Gradauskaite, 2010). In 
particular, Formula One (F1) entered a symbiotic relationship with tobacco firms 
(Grant-Braham and Briton, 2012).  
Political opportunity structure 
Alignment with other government’s preference: As insights into adverse health 
effects of tobacco consumption grew, governments started restricting tobacco 
advertising (Cairney, 2007). In 1998, the WHO proposed an International 
Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC) recommending a total 
advertising ban (Hoek and Sparks, 2000).  
Alignment with sport bodies’ preferences: In contrast to IOC and FIFA, F1 
fiercely opposed stricter regulations on tobacco advertising and threatened to relocate 
to other jurisdictions even though Europe was F1’s key market. Thus, F1 joined the 
tobacco industry in its efforts to block advertising and sponsorship bans in the EU 
(Bitton et al., 2002). 
Regulatory capacity and cohesion 
Legal mandate: The Commission was committed to stronger tobacco regulation and 
acted as EU lead negotiator in the FCTC process (Mamudu and Studlar, 2009). 
However, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 provided only a mandate to promote public 
health while building a single market but not to propose laws whose primary purpose 
was the advancement of public health (Duina and Kurzer, 2004). Hence, the 
Commission tried to circumvent its restricted legal mandate.  
Competing agendas at EU level: Besides resistance by some Member States there 
existed no competing agendas at EU level.  
Vertical conformity with Member States’ policies: Regulatory cohesion among 
the Member States was low. A number of Member States had already released strict 
bans on tobacco advertising, others, in particular Germany, perceived the tobacco 
industry as important economic sector and blocked any EU bans (Duina and Kurzer 
2004).  
Regulatory politics/processes 
Since Alegre (2003) as well as Duina and Kurzer (2004) have provided excellent 
accounts on the cumbersome legislative history of the first and second versions of the 
Tobacco Advertising Directive (TAD1 and TAD2 respectively), it suffices to refer 
basic process features. After the 1985 Directive on Television without Frontiers 
(89/552/EEC) banned tobacco advertising in audiovisual communications, a Council 
minority blocked further legislative progress until 1997 when TAD1 was adopted. 
TAD1 enacted in July 1998 banned tobacco advertising and sponsorship but allowed 
Member States to continue sponsorship of world-level events for an additional three 
years but not later than October 1st 2006. 
Already before, F1 had turned to venues outside the EU and convinced them 
to allow tobacco sponsorship (Xue and Mason, 2011). F1 continued to threaten to 
quit the EU (Hoek and Sparks, 2000; Bitton et al., 2002). Moreover, F1 boss Bernie 
Ecclestone donated in 1998 £1 million for the UK’s Labor Party election campaign. 
The Labor government allowed F1 to have tobacco sponsors in the UK races until 
October 2006, and voted against TAD2 (Cairney, 2007; Duina and Kurzer, 2004). 
Moreover, Germany and several British tobacco companies initiated legal actions 
against TAD1. The CJEU supported Germany’s claim that TAD1 was mainly created 
to protect public health and, accordingly, annulled TAD1 (Germany v. Parliament 
and Council, 2000 E.C.R. 1-8419). However, the CJEU indicated how a ban would 
be valid. Thus, in May 2001, the Commission proposed a new directive, which was 
adopted by qualified majority in the Council. TAD2 specified no transitional period 
for sport sponsorship and was supposed to enter into force in July 2005 (cf. Alegre, 
2003). 
Outcome 
TAD2 effectively ended business models in professional sport based on tobacco 
advertising and sponsorship. After 2006 most tobacco sponsorship of F1 came to an 
end (Grant-Braham and Briton, 2012). However, F1 did not abandon its EU sites as 
the problematic financial sustainability of racecourses made relocation difficult (Xue 
and Mason, 2013).  
Discussion and conclusion 
This article aimed to discuss three dimensions of the EU’s role in the regulation of 
global sport, as explained in the introduction. 
Concerning the extent to which one may identify EU’s aims in global sport 
regulation, the case studies leave the impression that the EU’s ambitions are rather 
limited to the attempt to reconcile the EU’s internal market regulations with the 
regulations of the international sport governing bodies. The only exception is anti-
doping where the EU aimed to impose governance standard. Thus, this is a rather 
reactive agenda mirroring the processes behind the evolution of sport regulation  
within the EU (García 2007). Thus, the EU’s main objectives were to iron out the 
incompatibilities between EU law and global sport regulations. The EU actions did 
not aim to directly regulate global sport. However, the EU pursues insofar a 
consistent regulatory approach as it does not hesitate to take on international sport 
governing bodies to ensure their policies abide by EU regulatory standards. 
Yet, the EU faces considerable problems in attaining regulatory cohesion, though, 
which results from competing policy agendas (Parrish, 2003; Croci, 2009), diverging 
preferences among the Member States as well as policy fragmentation.  
When reflecting the EU’s efficacy, its limited ambitions should be considered. 
Moreover, it is useful to compare the case studies in the lights of the theoretically 
derived concepts guiding the narratives (cf. Table 1). 
Table 1. Comparison of the case studies 
 
 
WADA process Player market Privacy Tobacco 
Political opportunity structure     
  Alignment with non-EU governments Very strong Unclear Very low Very strong 
  Alignment with sport governing 
bodies 
Very weak Very weak Very weak Very weak 
Regulatory capacity     
  Legal mandate Weak Very strong Very strong Weak 
  Competing agendas at EU level Concerns about EU 
competence creeping 
Competing sociocultural 
agenda hostile to player 
market liberalization 
Basic unresolved policy 
dilemmas 
Concerns about EU 
competence creeping 
  Vertical conformity Very strong Medium, as some 
Member States had 
already liberalized the 
player market 
Strong but basic 
unresolved policy 
dilemmas at the Member 
State level 
Strong resistance by some 
Member States 
Regulatory processes Decisive impact of some 
Member States, 
Commission 
participation in policy 
drafting 
Decisive impact of EU, 
interventions of Member 
States against 
Commission initiative, 
watering down of 
liberalization efforts 
Some impact despite EU 
isolation 
Cumbersome due to 
division of Member States, 
active threats by sport 
govering body 
Regulatory outcomes Achievement of major 
European policy aims 
Limited global player 
market liberalization 
Failure to globalize 
privacy standards, only 
limited regulatory 
concessions 
Lagged implementation of 
global standards 
 
Political opportunity structure: All of the EU’s regulatory ambitions were met 
with resistance by the sport governing bodies. Concerning other governments’ 
preferences, the political opportunity structure was most favorable in the WADA 
process whereas the EU was isolated on privacy.  
Regulatory capacity and cohesion: Policy cohesion was only high in the WADA 
process and had been established by the activities of the Council of Europe. In player 
market regulation the Commission possessed a robust mandate and strong procedural 
powers but competing policy agendas forced the Commission into compromises 
(García and Meier, 2013). Although whereabouts clearly conflicted with EU law, the 
EU did not manage to overcome the segregation of policy arenas. Finally, regulatory 
cohesion was lowest in case of tobacco regulation.  
Regulatory politics/processes: The case studies indicate that the EU possesses some 
structural power in global sport regulation enabling the EU to force the sport 
governing bodies at least into some concessions.  
Regulatory outcomes: With the exception of the creation of WADA, the EU failed 
to globalize its regulatory ambitions without making substantial concessions. 
However, the transfer regulations represent successful globalization of reduced and 
slightly contradictory ambitions. Concerning tobacco advertising, the EU was a 
policy laggard but managed to finally achieve its aims. Yet, the case of privacy 
represents a painful failure to globalize EU data-protection standards. Accordingly, it 
can be argued that the EU has been somehow influential in changing FIFA’s transfer 
system and nationality quotas and banning tobacco sponsorship of F1, at least within 
its own regulatory realm (cases 2 and 4), but less effective in protecting athletes’ 
rights (case 3). 
The EU’s impact was highest when its preferences aligned with those of other key 
markets, in particular the U.S, and policy cohesion was high even in the absence of 
clear legal mandate. The IOC was not able to resist pressure for regulatory reforms 
emanating from its key markets. In contrast, the EU was completely isolated on the 
issue of athletes’ privacy. In the case of player market regulation, the EU could push 
for substantial reforms on the base of a clear legal mandate. Thus, regulatory 
capacity appears to be a more-dimensional construct with high policy cohesion 
compensating to some extent for a clear legal mandate. In contrast, low regulatory 
capacity appears to be a crucial obstacle to regulatory success as privacy and tobacco 
regulation suggest. As stressed before, systematically controlling for variations in EU 
market size proved to be difficult. However, whereas the EU represents the central 
market for soccer and F1, regulatory outcomes differed substantially even though the 
F1 case suggests that relocation of sport events works only to some extent for sport 
governing bodies. Thus, it might be tentatively inferred that low regulatory capacity 
prevents the EU from making the best use of its structural powers. Hence, global 
sport regulation supports the traditional perspective according to which market size 
and regulatory capacity are important for globalizing the EU’s regulatory ambitions 
and the slight revisionist view that the broader political opportunity structure matters. 
In contrast, regulatory politics/process explanations seem not very relevant. The EU 
did not try to ‘upload’ regulatory preferences out of concerns about producers’ 
competitiveness. Rather, the EU’s efforts were triggered by tensions between EU law 
and sport regulations (see also Croci, 2009).  
Accordingly, it can be concluded that the EU’s efficacy as global regulator of 
sport is limited, which reflects to some extent the EU’s modest ambitions discussed 
above. While it might be emphasized that the EU was not (and has not) intended to 
regulate directly global sports, the combined dynamics of domestic market 
integration and external globalization make it likely for new regulatory issues to 
emerge, and for the EU to address them. Hence, increasing EU involvement in global 
sport policy might not be that exceptional. Moreover, this research is of broader 
relevance because in other sectors the EU is also confronted with private regulatory 
authorities and transnational corporations located outside the EU, which act as global 
regulators. Thus, global sport regulation illustrates the potential problems the EU 
faces in relation to these private regulators in case the EU lacks policy cohesion. 
From the traditional trade policy perspective, the insight that the EU is not a 
strong regulator of global sports might at first glance not be very relevant. However, 
the EU has a vital economic and social interest in soccer not only because of the 
industry’s relevance as media upstream market. By now, the professional game 
represents a flourishing export industry with the UEFA Champions League and top 
clubs as global brands (Deloitte, 2016). Thus, the EU has to be interested in 
protecting the industry’s integrity, which is threatened by corruption as well as match 
fixing. Yet even in face of an ‘objective’ need to address governance failures, the EU 
has left it to U.S. judicial authorities to address blatant corruption in FIFA. 
Admittedly, FIFA is not residing in the EU and has proven to be difficult to control 
(see, e.g. Pielke, 2013; Geeraert and Drieskens, 2015). However, the EU has been 
one of the very few public bodies able to impose some regulatory change on FIFA 
(Meier and García, 2015). Given the economic and social importance of soccer, the 
EU should make better use of its structural power and regulatory ‘ammunition’ that 
other actors at national level do not have in relation to FIFA and international sport 
governing bodies.  
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